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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
defense the insurer filed an exception of no right of action and
pleaded in bar the release given to the railroad without a reserva-
tion of rights. The exceptions and pleas in bar were overruled on
the ground that there had been no showing that the railroad was
a joint wrongdoer. The earlier case of Reid v. Lowden" was dis-
tinguished on the ground it was conceded in that case that the
party released was a co-tortfeasor. The court indicated in its
opinion a possibility that a showing might still be made that the
accident occurred through the joint negligence of the railroad
and the operator of the automobile but the method by which
this might be done was not indicated. This and other aspects of




Article 3066 of the Civil Code provides that "a judicial surety
cannot demand the discussion of the property of the principal
debtor.
"But no suit shall be instituted against any surety on appeal
bond, nor on the bond of any administrator, tutor, curator, exe-
cutor, or syndic until the necessary steps have been taken to
enforce payment against the principal."'
The question of what constitute the requisite "necessary
steps ... to enforce payment" was presented to the court in
Posey v. Hamner.2 That case was an action on a tutor's bond, by
his children, after the death of the tutor. The defendants, sureties
on the tutorship bond, urged successfully an exception of pre-
maturity on the ground that judicial proceedings were necessary
against the principal debtor or his representative prior to the
institution of suit against his sureties. This even though the tutor
may have died without leaving any property whatever, and
judicial proceedings against his succession would be "a vain and
useless effort."8
It is well established that "the necessary steps" required by
Article 3066 do not include the issuance of writs of execution
against the estates of deceased principal debtors prior to suit
21. 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939).
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 3066, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. 27 So.(2d) 158 (La. 1946).
3. 27 So.(2d) 158, 159.
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against their sureties.4 The court distinguished these cases, how-
ever, in Posey v. Hamner as involving a proceeding after judg-
ment had -been secured against the principal debtor. The rationale
of the cases so distinguished, however, was not based on that
point, but rather on the futility of the execution; in each of them
an appeal bond was involved, and, of course, the liability of the
surety for a judgment is expressly conditioned upon the rendi-
tion of such a judgment.
The provision of Article 3066 denying the exception of dis-
cussion to judicial sureties appears to have been adopted to ex-
pand the rights of creditors against such sureties, as compared
with the rights of creditors against conventional sureties. But
the doctrine of Posey v. Hamner appears to make the rights of
creditors against judicial sureties more onerous than those against
conventional sureties. For the conventional surety may be sued
before there is judgment against the principal debtor,' and the
surety's sole remedy in such cases is the exception of discussion,
which requires him to point out property of the principal debtor
subject to seizure and pay the costs of such seizure.6 At most, the
conventional surety can ask a stay of the action against him
pending the securing of judgment against the principal debtor
and the execution of that judgment.7
The court remarks that the doctrine of Posey v. Hamner
"seems somewhat harsh" under the facts of that case. This is
seen to be particularly true when it is considered that the judg-
ment against the principal is at best only prima facie evidence
against the surety.8 As a usual matter, the proceedings to secure
judgment against the principal debtor in a situation similar to
that presented in Posey v. Hamner would be perfunctory, at
best, and it would appear that time and expense would be con-
served and justice served as well, if not better, by permitting
proof of the debt in the proceeding against the surety. Even if
4. Alley v. Hawthorn, 1 La. Ann. 122 (1846); Trimble v. Brichta, 11 La.
Ann. 271 (1856); Murrison v. Butler, 20 La. Ann. 512 (1868); Lepretre v.
Barthet, 25 La. Ann. 124 (1873).
5. Curtis v. Martin, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 674 (La. 1818); Wood v. Fitz, 10 Mart.
(O.S.) 196 (La. 1821); Boutte v. Martin, 16 La. 133 (1840); Griffing v. Cald-
well, 1 Rob. 15 (La. 1841) (unless he properly pleads discussion, the surety's
remedy is to pay the debt and exercise his creditor's rights against the
creditor through subrogation).
6. Art. 3047, La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. Bernard v. Curtis, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 214 (La. 1816). And see Hill v. Bour-
cier, 29 La. Ann. 841 (1877).
8. See Fusz v. Trager, 39 La. Ann. 292, 1 So. 535 (1887); Horsthemke v.
National Surety Co., 151 La. 55, 91 So. 544 (1922); Hopkins v. National Surety
Co., 154 La. 61, 97 So. 297 (1923).
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the correctness of requiring a prior judgment against the prin-
cipal debtor be conceded, it would be less harsh merely to order
suspension of the judgment, instead of dismissing the suit. The
only right available to creditors proceeding on judicial bonds,
under the rule of Posey v. Hamner, which would mitigate the
effect of requiring the fruitless suit against the estate of the
insolvent deceased, is that of joining the surety and the repre-
sentatives of the principal debtor in a single action.9
Building Liens
Although Louisiana Act 298 of 1926,10 creating liens on im-
movables in favor of laborers and materialmen, affords the land-
owner adequate means to safeguard himself by the recordation of
his contract together with a bond exacted from the contractor,
this protection is frequently overlooked. The possible conse-
quences of such failure, on both the owner at the time the con-
struction contract is made and subsequent purchasers of the
immovable, are illustrated in the case of Glassell, Taylor, &
Robinson v. John W. Harris Associates, Incorporated," where
exceptions of no cause of action were dismissed, rendering the
contracting owner personally and the immovable in the hands
of a subsequent purchaser potentially encumbered by a lien to
the sum of $383,317.39.
Louisiana Act 298 of 1926, which replaced earlier legislation
on the same subject, creates a comprehensive building liens
structure, which was designed to protect all the parties involved
in a construction contract from the hazards frequently incident
to such contracts. Section 1 of the act creates a "lien and privi-
lege" in favor of laborers, materialmen, and other parties en-
gaged in the work."2 Section 2 provides for recordation of con-
struction contracts and permits the landowner to protect himself
from liens by requiring bond of the contractor, conditioned on
the faithful performance of the contract and the payment of all
debts under it.13 Section 12 provides for the personal liability of
the landowner, as well as for the subjection of the immovable
to liens, if no contract is recorded, or if the owner fails to take
other action prescribed by the statute, but its language is not so
9. Art. 3051, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Brock v. First State Bank
& Trust Co., 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937).
10. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5106-5122.
11. 209 La. 957, 26 So.(2d) 1 (1946).
12. La. Act 298 of 1926, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5106].
13. Id. at § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5107].
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detailed as that of Section 1 in listing those who are entitled to
avail themselves of the benefits of the section.14
In the Glassell case, the landowner entered into a contract
with a general contractor for construction of a housing project.
The general contractor made sub-contracts with the plaintiff for
the construction of a sewerage system, roads, and other work
involved in the project. The general contract was not recorded,
nor, apparently, was any bond exacted or recorded. Subsequently
the landowner conveyed the property to the general contractor
who in turn sold to the present owner. While the project was
still under construction, a dispute arose between the plaintiff
and the general contractor which resulted in the ouster of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon recorded liens for damages
alleged due, and brought suit against the original landowner and
the subsequent transferees in solido. By means of an exception
of no cause of action, the original landowner and the present
owners raised the question of the right of the subcontractor to
either a lien or a personal cause of action against them.
The reasoning of the defendant's unsuccessful argument was
that the general contractor can acquire no lien unless his contract
is recorded in accordance with the procedure outlined in Section
2 of the act, that Section 12 of the act providing for liens and for
a personal right of action in case no contract is recorded applies
only to laborers and materialmen, that subcontractors acquire
no rights greater than those of the general contractor, and that
therefore the sole right of the subcontractor where no general
contract has been recorded is a personal right against the general
contractor. This argument convinced the trial judge.
But, reasoned the supreme court, no such hiatus in the act
was intended. The subcontractor is entitled, under the intend-
ment of the statute, to the rights granted in Section 12, including
a lien on the property and a personal right of action against the
owner where the owner fails to record the contract, even though
subcontractors, elsewhere expressly mentioned in the act, are not
mentioned in Section 12. Indeed, despite the failure of Section
12 specifically to mention subcontractors, they appear to be em-
braced within its terminology, which applies to "any person furn-
ishing service or material or performing any labor on said build-
ing or other work to or for a contractor or subcontractor," as the
court pointed out."5
14. Id. at § 12 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5117].
15. 209 La. 957, 974, 26 So.(2d) 1, 6 (1946).
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Officer v. Combre,1s in which the Court of Appeal for the
First Circuit held that Section 12 gave no right of lien to a gen-
eral contractor, impressed the trial judge as "decisive"; the su-
preme court affirmed it only as to result, refusing to adopt its
reasoning. That case, although excluding the general contractor
from the provisions of Section 12 because he is not expressly
mentioned, can be sustained on the theory that it is the contrac-
tor's own fault if he is not fully protected by recordation of the
contract pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 whereas the subcontractor
has no such means of protection and is placed in his precarious
position through the combined failures of the owner and the
general contractor to record the contract and bond.
In National Homestead Association v. Graham,17 the supreme
court had previously held the provisions of Section 12 applicable
to one who contracted directly with the landowner, although not
as a general contractor. Taken together, the cases therefore can
be said to apply the general rule that the provisions of Section 12
can be utilized by any party entitled to the benefits of the act
generally, even though not specifically named in Section 12, ex-
cept general contractors.
The court further held that the owner at the time the con-
tract was made is the "owner" who is subject to personal liability
under the provisions of Section 12, and later transferees are "only
liable in rem" unless they specifically assumed the liability of
their vendor.18 Although this is contrary to the interpretation of
the earlier building liens statute," the ruling appears justified by
changes in terminology in the statutes. 0
Scale-Down Agreements in Federal Farm Mortgages
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Hatten21 involved a
suit by the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation to have a judg-
ment secured on a note taken by a creditor of a farmer in viola-
tion of a scale-down agreement. Under authority of the Emerg-
ency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933,22 the Federal Farm Mortgage
16. 194 So. 441 (La. App. 1940).
17. 176 La. 1062, 147 So. 348 (1933).
18. Glassell, Taylor & Robinson v. John W. Harris Associates, Inc., 209
La. 957, 974, 26 So.(2d) 1, 6 (1946).
19. See Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co. v. Rudy, 156 La. 174, 100 So. 296
(1924).
20. Compare La. Act 298 of 1926, § 12 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5117], with
La. Act 229 of 1916, §§ 1, 3. The earlier act made no provision for personal
liability on the owner, and contained no clause comparable to Section 12
of the 1926 act.
21. 210 La. 249, 26 So.(2d) 735 (1946).
22. 48 Stat. 48, § 32, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1016 (1933).
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Corporation had secured scale-down agreements from the credi-
tors of a farm-owner, and had executed a mortgage on the land
of the farm-owner based on these agreements. One of the assent-
ing creditors on the same day secured a note from the debtor,
which he later reduced to judgment, then transferred to a third
party, who was found not to be a holder in good faith. This judg-
ment was recorded in 1936; in 1944 the Federal Farm Corporation
sued the original creditor and his transferee to have the judgment
declared void and cancelled from the mortgage records and to
enjoin a sale of the debtor's property in execution of the judg-
ment.
The court applied fairly well settled principles to sustain the
plaintiff's suit. Any security given a scale-down creditor in ad-
dition to the amount received from the federal loan agency was
declared void,21 not only as between the parties but also as against
the federal agency.24 The court found that the federal agency
possessed the necessary interest to sue in its pecuniary interest
in the security given for its mortgage and in the ability of the
debtor to pay the federal loan. The questions resolved by appli-
cation of Louisiana law were primarily procedural, and are dis-
cussed elsewhere in this article.
Rank of Mortgages Relative to Tax Liens
In the case of Oil Well Supply Company v. Red Iron Drilling
Company,21 elsewhere discussed at greater length, 2c' a recorded
mortgage was held to prime judgments later secured for unpaid
power, severance, and corporation franchise taxes. Under au-
thority of the Uniform Tax Procedure Act,27 the case justifies
reliance upon the public records to afford parties dealing with
immovables-and, incidentally, movables 2 51-protection against
unrecorded incumbrances in the form of tax liens.
23. Russell v. Douget, 171 So. 501 (La. App. 1936). See also the host of
cases cited in the opinion, 210 La. 249, 26 So.(2d) 735, 738. The question is
also annotated in (1943) 147 A.L.R. 743.
24. O'Neil v. Johnson, 29 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Calif. 1939); Jones v. Mc-
Farland, 178 Miss. 282, 173 So. 296 (1937); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v.
Koslofsky, 67 N.D. 322, 271 N.W. 907 (1937). See also the annotations in
(1943) 147 A.L.R. 743.
25. 210 La. 222, 26 So.(2d) 726 (1946).
26. Supra, p. 177.
27. La. Act 265 of 1940, § 3, as amended by La. Act 157 of 1942 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8422.3].
28. The lien procedure of the Uniform Tax Procedure Act applies to both




In re Union Central Life Insurance Company" involved a
number of interesting rulings. In 1929, E. D. Thomas mortgaged
a tract of land, which was his separate property, 0 to the Union
Central Life Insurance Company. Thomas died intestate, and, in
1931, pursuant to court order to sell for cash to pay debts, his
administrator sold the tract to Dora Thomas, wife of the de-
ceased. The administrator's deed recited that the consideration
had been paid in cash, but the administrator's return on his com-
mission to sell showed that Dora Thomas had retained the con-
sideration for the purpose of discharging the mortgage.
In 1933, Dora Thomas failed to meet the mortgage payments,
and the insurance company foreclosed, by hypothecary action
against Dora Thomas, as third possessor, and against the admin-
istrator of the succession, who had been discharged. The heirs of
the succession were not cited. At the sheriff's sale the property
was purchased by the insurance company, which later conveyed
it to other parties, then subsequently repurchased it and brought
this monition proceeding31 to be decreed owner.
Under this set of facts the court held:
(1) The sale to Dora Thomas was "absolutely null." The ad-
judicatee did not pay in cash, which was an essential term of the
sale.
(2) Therefore, title remained in the heirs of E. D. Thomas.
(3) The foreclosure by Union Central was of no effect; for
the heirs of E. D. Thomas were not cited, and Dora Thomas was
not a third possessor, who might be proceeded against by the
hypothecary action without citing the legal owners.
(4) Therefore Union Central derived no title from the sale,
and it owes the heirs of Thomas damages for cutting timber on
the property. Legally it was a possessor in bad faith because it
knew all the preceding facts. For the same reason, it could not
claim the benefits of good faith prescription under Civil Code
Article 3543.
(5) The notes for which the mortgage was given have pre-
29. 208 La. 253, 23 So.(2d) 63 (1945).
30. For this reason, apparently, Code of Practice Article 734, authorizing
proceeding against the personal representative of a deceased mortgagor was
not relied upon. The article has been interpreted to authorize proceedings
against the surviving spouse in community, as to mortgaged community
property. See Slayton v. Swor, 195 So. 85 (La. App. 1940).
31. See La. Act 74 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9021-9025].
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scribed, but the insurance company may credit their sum against
what it now owes the heirs of Thomas.
Justice Rogers dissented, without rendering a written opinion,
and Chief Justice O'Niell dissented, stating briefly that Dora
Thomas was a third possessor within the meaning of Code of
Practice Article 68.
The crux of the matter became therefore the question: Who
is a third possessor? The majority of the court quoted with ap-
proval this definition: "One who buys the mortgaged property
without assuming to pay the mortgage. '8 2 To this the court ap-
parently added: One who buys the property and gets good title.
If this be the ratio decidendi, then certain other interesting prob-
lems are raised. What if the purchaser buys the property but has
a defective title, one which is voidable at the option of the mort-
gagor-vendor? Is the plaintiff in the hypothecary action against
the third possessor bound to determine the validity of the de-
fendant's title before proceeding against him?
Other questions are raised by the definition of "good faith"
in dealing with the five-year prescriptive period against infor-
malities in public sales created by Civil Code Article 3543. The
insurance company was in bad faith because, alleging that Dora
Thomas did not acquire good title as against the mortgagor, it
did not cite the heirs of E. D. Thomas. Apparently, then, the
"good faith" required is not merely factual "good faith," or a
clear conscience, but observation of legal rules, whether or not
they are clear. That the question of whether the hypothecary
action against Dora Thomas and the administrator was a proper
method of proceeding was at least a debatable one is demon-
strated by the fact that the chief justice dissented expressly on
this point, while Justice Rogers dissented generally.
Against this technical definition of "good faith" stands the
roughly measured "equity" awarded the insurance company in
permitting it to off-set its prescribed notes against the damages
due the heirs of E. D. Thomas. This was not based on any theories
of "compensation," 88 strictly speaking, as indeed there was at
least a question of whether the debts were "equally liquidated
and demandable," 8 but on the "moral maxim of the law ... that
no one ought to enrich himself at the expense of another."
If the implications of the case are closely followed in the
32. Quoting from Thompson v. Levy, 50 La. Ann. 751, 23 So. 913 (1898).
33. Art. 2207, La. Civil Code of 1870.
34. See Art. 2209, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19V']
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future, an interesting set of sequels should result. If the rules,
on the other hand, are confined to "goose cases," some finely knit
logic of distinction will have to be produced.
PROPERTY
Joseph Dainow*
In the case of Dickson v. Board of Commissioners of Caddo
Levee District,' a riparian proprietor claimed damages sustained
by his property through erosion. This erosion was the result of
an artificial current which had been created in the river and
thrown against his plantation at a right angle when defendants
made two straight channels, or cut-offs, across two bends of the
river above plaintiff's property. The court's opinion, rendered
by Justice Fournet, contains a clear and interesting history of
the servitude under Article 665 of the Revised Civil Code2 which
is imposed on riparian properties for levee purposes. From the
construction of the first levees by the French in 1727, through
the Spanish regime, and until 1878, the matter of flood control
was an obligation on the riparian proprietors. Accordingly, when
flood control became a governmental function, it was a consid-
erable relief of responsibility even though the land remained
subject to the use without compensation. The beneficent estab-
lishment of compensation-in 1898 for Orleans," and in 1921 for
the whole state4-did not alter the nature of the servitude; and
the levee districts are invested by statute with complete au-
thority for the determination, construction and maintenance of
flood control works. In the present case, the actions of the de-
fendant were properly performed for the preservation of exist-
ing levees, and the plaintiff's only recourse would be to claim the
compensation allowed under the constitution for lands taken,
used or destroyed. Since the plaintiff was not making this kind of
claim, and his action did not meet the requirement of such a
claim, the defendant's exception of no cause of action was main-
tained and the suit dismissed.
In the case of Breaux v. Lefort' a group of plaintiffs claimed
ownership of a tract of land. Their predecessors had instituted
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 210 La. 121, 26 So. (2d) 474 (1946).
2. For texts of corresponding articles in prior civil codes, see Compiled
Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, p. 383.
3. La. Const. (1898) Art. 312.
4. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, § 6.
5. 209 La. 506, 24 So. (2d) 879 (1946).
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